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Abstract
A macroeconomic model based on the economic variables (i) assets, (ii) leverage (defined as debt
over asset) and (iii) trust (defined as the maximum sustainable leverage) is proposed to investigate
the role of credit in the dynamics of economic growth, and how credit may be associated with both
economic performance and confidence. Our first notable finding is the mechanism of reward/penalty
associated with patience, as quantified by the return on assets. In regular economies where the
EBITA/Assets ratio is larger than the cost of debt, starting with a trust higher than leverage results
in the highest long-term return on assets (which can be seen as a proxy for economic growth).
Therefore, patient economies that first build trust and then increase leverage are positively rewarded.
Our second main finding concerns a recommendation for the reaction of a central bank to an external
shock that affects negatively the economic growth. We find that late policy intervention in the model
economy results in the highest long-term return on assets and largest asset value. But this comes at
the cost of suffering longer from the crisis until the intervention occurs. The phenomenon that late
intervention is most effective to attain a high long-term return on assets can be ascribed to the fact
that postponing intervention allows trust to increase first, and it is most effective to intervene when
trust is high. These results derive from two fundamental assumptions underlying our model: (a) trust
tends to increase when it is above leverage; (b) economic agents learn optimally to adjust debt for a
given level of trust and amount of assets. Using a Markov Switching Model for the EBITA/Assets
ratio, we have successfully calibrated our model to the empirical data of the return on equity of the
EURO STOXX 50 for the time period 2000-2013. We find that dynamics of leverage and trust can
be highly non-monotonous with curved trajectories, as a result of the nonlinear coupling between
the variables. This has an important implication for policy makers, suggesting that simple linear
forecasting can be deceiving in some regimes and may lead to inappropriate policy decisions.
Keywords: Macroeconomics, Complex Systems, Assets, Leverage, Trust, regime shifting, crisis
1 Introduction
The credit crisis and panic that erupted in 2008 in the US and spilled over the World have made
again clear that financial price and economic value are based fundamentally on trust; not on fancy
mathematical formulas, not on subtle self-consistent efficient economic equilibrium; but on trust in
the future, trust in economic growth, trust in the ability of debtors to face their liabilities, trust in
financial institutions to play their role as multipliers of economic growth, trust that our money in a
bank account can be redeemed at any time we choose. Usually, we take these facts for granted. When
depositors happen to doubt banks, this leads to devastating bank runs. When banks start to doubt
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other banks, this leads to a freeze of the inter-banking loan markets and an effective run on collaterised
assets. Then, the implicit processes of a working economy –all we take for granted– starts to dysfunction
and spirals into a global collapse, as almost happened with the Lehmann Brothers Bankruptcy. The
standard discourse by observers and pundits is to attribute the 2008 crisis to the mortgage-backed
securities linked to the bursting of the house price bubble, the irresponsible lending, overly complex
financial instruments and conflicts of interest leading to asymmetric information translated into market
illiquidity, and the spreading of risks via packaging and selling of imagined valuations to unsuspecting
investors. What is missing in this discussion is to endogenise trust in the dynamics of the credit system.
As a contribution to fill this gap, we construct a simple macroeconomic model, based on basic accounting
rules combined with reasonable economic assumptions, which put trust as the central dynamical variable.
Focusing on credit creation and its dynamics, we naturally use asset amount and leverage (here defined
as the ratio debt to asset) as the two other variables. To operationalise the model, we define trust as the
maximum sustainable leverage. This transforms an a priori ill-defined qualitative concept, capturing
the degree of belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of something, into a quantitative variable that
can be worked with.
Our motivation to focus on the three variables (i) assets, (ii) leverage and (iii) trust is that these
are three key economic variables for studying different economic regimes, since they relate to credit,
which has a central role in economics as a driver of economic cycles. For example, credit is pivotal to
understand the financial crisis of 2008. Ahead of the 2008 crisis, credit was easily available: a high
percentage of asset value could be used as collateral to obtain a loan. The high availability of credit
caused debt levels and leverage to increase rapidly. At a certain moment, this drastically changed
and credit crunched: the financial crisis of 2008 was a fact. To exemplify the importance of credit
today: the current global public debt is over 57 trillion U.S. dollar (“The global debt clock”, n.d.).
For comparison, the Gross World Product (GWP) is about 78 trillion U.S. dollar (“Gross domestic
product 2014”, 2015). For the United States, the public debt as a percentage of GDP is over 90% at
the time of writing. The central role of credit (debt) in an economy suggests to focus on the modelling
the interplay between assets (assets serve as a collateral to obtain a loan), leverage (the debt to assets
value) and trust (the maximum sustainable leverage).
The link between credit and the afore-mentioned variables has been qualitatively discussed by Von der
Becke and Sornette (2014), who provided a qualitative framework in which credit creation is argued
to depend on the amount of collateral assets accepted, the level of leverage and the level of trust and
confidence in future cash flows. In their paper, a qualitative theory was proposed to understand credit
creation and the perspectives of different schools of thought were integrated (Austrian, Mainstream
and Post Keynesian). Besides the paper of Von der Becke and Sornette (2014), there are numerous
other papers in which assets, leverage and trust are (mostly separately) studied.
Geanakoplos (2010) presents a model in which the interplay of leverage and assets is captured. In this
model, a set-up is used in which houses are used as collateral for long-term loans, and loans are used
as collateral for repos1. Based on this framework, Geanakoplos (2010) advocates that leverage rates
should be the primary target (instead of interest rates) of central banks in times of crisis.
Asset prices are a central theme in, for example, the research of Bernanke et al. (2001). Their paper
studies whether central banks should respond to movements in asset prices. Borio and Lowe (2002)
linked price changes of assets to financial instability: sustained rapid credit growth combined with large
increases in asset prices tends to increase the probability of financial instability. Based on historical
data, the research showed that significant changes in asset prices are linked to increased financial
instability. It is argued that monetary policy should respond to changing asset prices with the goal of
1Abbreviation for repurchase agreements, i.e. short-term collateralized loans.
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preserving financial stability.
Lang et al. (1996) present a study in which leverage is the main variable that is studied and it is
demonstrated that an inverse relation between leverage and future growth of firms with a low q-ratio2
exists. Leverage as an indicator for growth opportunities is also a theme in a study of Gilchrist (2003),
who hypothesizes that high leverage economies are particularly vulnerable to slowdowns in the world
economy.
Putnam et al. (1994) initiated the study of trust (“social capital”) and its relation to the well-functioning
of a society by providing case studies of the functioning of regional governments in Italy. Knack and
Keefer (1997) have investigated trust and its impact on the economy. Survey data was used to capture
trust and it was found that “social capital” (indicated by trust) matters for economic performance.
Dincer and Uslaner (2010) confirm this finding based on data from U.S. states in which a positive
relation between trust and economic growth was found. In a study of Bjørnskov (2012), it has been
investigated through what mechanisms trust affects economic growth and trust is proposed to be the
fundamental driver of economic development. There is no full consensus on the relation between trust
and economic growth. Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) could not verify the link between trust and economic
growth and they concluded that there may not always be an economic pay-off of trust. Hence, there
exists no consensus on a relation between trust and economic performance and one should keep in mind
that the definition of trust may differ in various papers.
In order to position our model, it is useful to provide a short overview of influential macroeconomic
models in the academic and central banking literature. This overview is useful to to position our assets,
leverage and trust model.
The New-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is one of the most influential
models in the academic and central banking community (see e.g. Sbordone et al. (2010) for an overview
of DSGE models and see Isoha¨ta¨la¨ et al. (2015) for an overview of DSGE models and beyond). The
model is built around three coupled equations, which derive from micro-foundations: supply, demand
and monetary policy equations. Furthermore, equations describing expectations can be explicitly taken
into account in the DSGE framework. A strong element of the model is that it can capture the response
of output and inflation to demand, supply and policy shocks. DSGE models however failed to explain
the significant rapid changes (declines) in asset prices, output and investment that occurred during the
2008 crisis and thereafter (Isoha¨ta¨la¨ et al., 2015; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
As a response to this inability to model the 2008 crisis, a strand of the recent literature focussed
on introducing dynamics to account for the possible occurrence of extreme events that abruptly and
significantly influence economic quantities such as asset prices, output or investment. Examples of
influential recent papers that focus on this are those by He and Krishnamurthy (2011) and Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2012). The new models employ continuous time modelling approaches to macroeconomic
problems and assume market incompleteness (i.e. not all risks can be hedged). This approach is
mathematically convenient as it allows one to characterise the possible economic states by (partial)
differential equations. A characteristic of the new class of models is that, in the limit of small (zero)
disturbances/volatility, the non-linear dynamics of the model reduces to a linearised DSGE model.
Variants of the afore-mentioned models, as well as the model constructed in this research, can eventually
be used to assess policy measures of central banks. Bacchetta et al. (2015) focus on the question
whether monetary policy can help to avert self-fulfilling debt crises and at what cost (particularly in
terms of inflation). Their paper builds on earlier sovereign debt crisis models and extends these with
the goal of quantifying the afore-mentioned cost. A model on which it builds is that of Lorenzoni and
2Tobin’s q-ratio is defined as the total market value of the firm divided by the the total asset value.
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Werning (2013) who introduced a real sovereign debt crisis model (without a monetary authority),
in which a government defaults at a predetermined time T if the present value of debt exceeds the
present value of future primary surpluses (i.e. government spending, excluding interest payments, minus
income from taxes). Bacchetta et al. (2015) extend the model to a monetary economy, which provides
a convenient framework to study conventional monetary policies (in particular the effects of inflation
and interest rate). Furthermore, it allows to study additional (non conventional) monetary tools, such
as buying government bonds by considering the budget constraint of a central bank. Bacchetta et
al. (2015) assess the conventional monetary policies (operating through interest rates) using a New
Keynesian DSGE model based on Gal´ı (2009) with extensions by Woodford (2003) to introduce a delay
in the impact of monetary policy shocks. Bacchetta et al. (2015) conclude that the conventional tools
of the central bank, aimed at averting a debt crisis, lead to high inflation for a sustained period of time.
Unconventional monetary policies (e.g. quantitative easing: the purchase of government securities or
other securities from the market) are suggested to be effective only when an economy is at the zero
lower bound (ZLB), i.e. when the short-term interest rate is at 0.
The organisation of the present article is as following. Section 2 gives the formal definition of our three
fundamental variables as well as a number of derived quantities. It then states the three governing
ordinary differential equations, whose derivation is presented in Appendix 2.2 and some closed-formed
solutions are given. The fixed point stability analysis is also presented. Section 3 presents a survey of
the main properties of the model, by showing phase portraits of the trajectories in the leverage-trust
space and by quantifying the associated return on asset. Section 4 uses the model to investigate what
happens under regime shifts, either due to some exogenous adverse shock leading to a sustained crisis
(negative growth rate) and/or as a result of policy intervention in the form of decreased target interest
rates and increased return on assets. Section 5 presents the calibration of the model, extended using a
Markov Switching framework for an exogenous model parameter, to the return on equity of the EURO
STOXX 50 for the time period 2000-2013. Section 6 concludes. The derivations and proofs of the main
results are presented in Appendices A and B.
2 Formalisation of the joint dynamics of assets, leverage and trust
2.1 Basic definitions: assets, leverage, trust
The following definitions clarify the meaning of our three key economic variables and introduce their
growth rates.
Definition 1. The total asset value at time t is denoted by A(t). Asset value can always be written as
the sum of debt and equity:
A(t) := D(t) + E(t), (1)
where D(t) is the debt at time t, and E(t) is the equity at time t.
Definition 2. The leverage at time t, denoted L(t), is defined here as:
L(t) := D(t)/A(t). (2)
Banks usually operate with leverage ratios close to 1, while “normal firms” usually operate with lower
leverage ratios. The leverage is an interesting quantity to examine since it quantifies the indebtedness
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of an economy and is linked to risk and volatility. As a side note, the standard way of defining leverage
is Ls := D/E. For this study, the definition given by Eq.(2) is more convenient to link to the trust
variable to be defined formally in definition 3. L in Eq.(2) is related to Ls through L =
Ls
1+Ls
. While Ls
has no limit in principle, L has an upper limit of one, corresponding to the limit of zero equity (E = 0).
Definition 3. The trust T (t) is defined as the fraction of the total assets that qualifies as collateral for
taking on debt. The trust can hence be viewed to represent a borrower’s creditworthiness. It is assumed
that under normal circumstances the level of trust T (t) satisfies the following inequality:
D(t) ≤ T (t) ·A(t). (3)
This inequality expresses that in general the debt D should not exceed the total value of acceptable
collateral. This holds simply by definition of what is meant by “acceptable collateral” and derives from
the nature of lending where the lender hedges his risks by ensuring that the borrower has assets at least
as large as the borrowed amount.
We should note that periods of market exuberance have been characterised by a failure of this inequality,
as for instance for subprime “NINJA loans” (loans extended to people with “No Income, No Job, (and)
no Assets).
Definition 4. In this study, the return on assets (ROA), defined by
rA(t) :=
1
A
dA
dt
, (4)
is viewed as a proxy for economic growth.
We will also use the growth rate rD(t) :=
1
D
dD
dt of debt, the return rE(t) :=
1
E
dE
dt on equity (ROE) and
the growth rate rL(t) :=
1
L
dL
dt of leverage.
From differentiation of ln(D) = ln(L) + ln(A) (Eq.(2)) with respect to t, the growth rate rL(t) of
leverage, the growth rate rD(t) of debt and the return rA(t) on assets are linked by the simple relation
rD(t) = rL(t) + rA(t). (5)
2.2 System equations for the joint dynamics of assets, leverage and trust
We now derive the coupled dynamics of assets, leverage and trust.
2.2.1 Auxiliary definitions
Before presenting the fundamental equations for assets, debt and trust, it is necessary to introduce
additional definitions.
Definition 5. Depreciations Ddt(t) (over a period dt) are given by:
Ddt(t) = δdtA(t), (6)
where δdt is a depreciation factor, indicating what fraction of asset value is “lost” over a time period of
dt.
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Definition 6. Amortization Adt(t) (over a period dt) is given by:
Adt(t) = D(t− dt)−D(t), (7)
where Adt(t) > 0 if the debt decreases (the word derives from “amortisen”, which means “to kill”:
decrease debt in this case). Note that Adt(t) < 0 if more debt is taken on.
Definition 7. The definition of net income (NI), also referred to as net earnings, Edt(t) follows from
accounting:
Edt(t) = κdtA(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
EBITDA
− δdtA(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Depreciations
− [D(t− dt)−D(t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Amortization︸ ︷︷ ︸
EBIT
− rdtD(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interests payments
, (8)
in which κdt is defined as the EBITDA to assets ratio. Furthermore, rdt is the interest rate paid on
debt. The subscripts dt refers to a period dt (so e.g. Edt(t) are the net earnings generated over a time
period dt). Note that taxes are neglected in the model (in case of taxes, these should be subtracted from
EBIT as well in Eq.(8); such that NI=EBIT-Interest-Taxes)
Furthermore, the net earnings can be classified by how they are allocated: they are either paid out as
dividends to the shareholders, or reinvested into the company and/or maintained as cash.
Edt(t) = poutEdt(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dividends
+ pbackEdt(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Retained Earnings
, (9)
where pout is the pay out ratio and pback is the plow back ratio. Note that: pout + pback = 1. In the next
sections, it is assumed that pback = 1, and hence the net earnings are equal to the retained earnings.
This assumption can be motivated by invoking the Modigliani–Miller theorem (Miller and Modigliani,
1961): a firm’s dividend policy is irrelevant for the valuation of shares, under idealized conditions which
include the absence of taxation, transaction costs, asymmetric information and market imperfections.
2.2.2 Assets
From basic accounting under the assumption of a plow back ratio of 1, it follows that:
Asset value(t) = Asset value(t− dt) + Net Income(t). (10)
Using the notation as introduced in section 2.2.1:
A(t) = A(t− dt) + Edt(t), (11)
(8)
= A(t− dt) + (κdt − δdt)A(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
EBITA
− [D(t− dt)−D(t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Amortization
− rdtD(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest payments
. (12)
By defining gdt to be the EBITA/Assets ratio, i.e. gdt := κdt − δdt, Eq.(12) can be rewritten as follows:
A(t)−A(t− dt) = gdtA(t)− rdtD(t) + [D(t)−D(t− dt)]. (13)
By dividing Eq.(13) by dt and taking the limit dt→ 0, one obtains:
dA
dt
= gA(t)− rD(t) + dD
dt
, (14)
where g := lim
dt→0
gdt
dt
and r := lim
dt→0
rdt
dt
. Eq.(14) is the the governing equation for assets.
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2.2.3 Trust
To construct a fundamental equation for trust, we firstly assume that in the absence of externalities
(that might cause abrupt changes in the trust) the trust increases to its maximum value T = 1, where
all assets qualify as collateral. A tendency for trust to increase is thus assumed. This assumption can
be supported by both a psychological and a rational phenomenon. The psychological phenomenon is
the prosociality of humans: people have a tendency of helping, benefiting and trusting others and/or
society (Dovidio et al., 2006). The rational phenomenon is the aim to use all assets and let the economy
function at its “full potential”. In an economy that functions to its full potential, the trust is at
its maximum. This is favourable because the higher the trust, the more credit there can be to fund
profitable projects (if trust is 1, 100% of the asset value is accepted as a collateral to obtain a loan).
A convenient and common function to capture the growth of the trust to its maximum 1, is the
logistic function (“S-curve”). It was first introduced by Pierre Verhulst in the nineteenth century to
describe population growth, but it has a wide range of applications in many fields. For example, it has
applications in statistical physics (Fermi-Dirac), demography, and to model the dynamics of the market
penetration of a product or service. A standard logistic equation for trust would thus be:
dT
dt
= kT (1− T ), (15)
where 1/k > 0 denotes the inertia (resistance) of the trust to change. Eq.(15) captures the standard
features of a logistic equation. For low T , Eq.(15) simplifies to
dT
dt
≈ kT , which expresses that the
growth rate of trust is proportional to the existing trust. This type of accumulation of trust is named
the Matthew effect (Merton, 1968). In this context it follows that, the higher the level of existing
trust, the faster trust grows (“cumulative advantage”). For T close to 1 (large T ), Eq.(15) simplifies
to
dT
dt
≈ k(1− T ), which shows that the rate of change of trust (dTdt ) decreases when T approaches 1.
Note that when T → 1 or T → 0 then a steady-state is reached (dTdt → 0 in Eq.(15)).
It is desired that the growth of trust is positive when trust exceeds leverage, while it should be negative
when leverage exceeds trust. In this way, a convergence to the “natural optimum” T = L is imposed.
By adding a multiplication of (T − L) to Eq.(15), this feature is captured. The following “extended”
logistic equation is hence postulated for the trust:
dT
dt
= k(T − L)T (1− T ). (16)
Another way to justify the term (T −L) is to argue that the growth rate k of trust should be modulated
by (T − L), being positive if T > L and negative if T < L. A first order Taylor expansion then yields
the form leading to expression (16). The “extended” logistic equation (Eq.(16)) is more complex than
the standard logistic equation (Eq.(15)) because a constant trust (steady-state) can be reached when
either L→ T , T → 1, or T → 0 which ever occurs first. Given that we start from an initial condition
T (0) > L(0), this means that if L “catches up” with T before T → 1, a stationary condition is reached
where Tstationary = Lstationary.
2.2.4 Debt
Based on the assumption of a tendency for economies to increase debt levels, as argued by e.g. Dalio
(2015) and empirically supported by Graeber (2011), a debt dynamics will be proposed in this subsection.
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We assume a tendency for economies to reach its maximal debt, while taking into account Eq.(3). This
implies, in mathematical terms, that D = TA should be imposed to be a natural fixed point.
Then, the next point of reasoning is that a non-instantaneous convergence of D → TA is assumed.
There exists inertia for D to reach TA because it takes time to find investment opportunities and it only
makes sense to increase debt when such opportunities exist. This can be supported by, for example,
Taylor (2002) and DeAngelo et al. (2011). Taylor (2002) discusses that there are occurrences in history
where the capital mobility (moving funds internationally) was found to be low. DeAngelo et al. (2011)
discuss leverage ratios with slow average speeds of adjustment to target level.
The governing equations for the debt is postulated to be:
d(D − TA)
dt
= −a(D − TA), (17)
⇔ dD
dt
= a(TA−D) + d(TA)
dt
, (18)
where 1/a > 0 captures the inertia of debt convergence to its optimal value. Note that Eq.(18) is valid
for D < TA and D > TA: in both cases there is a tendency for D → TA.
As previously mentioned, Eq.(18) is constructed such that D tends to converge to TA. This convergence
of D to TA would already be ensured without the term d(TA)dt in Eq.(18), however this term can boost
or slow down the change in D, depending on the rate of change (trend) in TA. The proposed debt
equation (Eq.(18)) assumes that this trend of TA is known and incorporates this. We assume that
economic agents learn optimally to adjust debt for a given level of trust and amount of assets.
2.2.5 Final equations for assets, leverage, trust
In this section, we outline how the final differential equations for assets, leverage, trust can be obtained.
First of all, Eq.(14), (16), (18) are divided by k, thereby making the equations non-dimensional. We
introduce the non-dimensional time τ , which we define as follows:
τ := kt. (19)
We denote non-dimensional model parameters (a, g, r) with a tilde, for example: a˜ := a/k.
By substitution of Eq.(18), and then Eq.(16), in Eq.(14) we obtain the final assets equation:
dA
dτ
=
(
g˜ − r˜L+ a˜(T − L)
1− T + (T − L)T
)
A, (20)
The final leverage equation can be obtained by using the definition of leverage (Eq.(2)) and the trust
equation (Eq.(16)):
dL
dτ
= (T − L)
(
g˜ − r˜L+ a˜(1− L)
1− T + (1− L)T
)
, (21)
which can also be written as follows:
dL
dτ
= (T − L)
(
β
L0 − L
1− T + T (1− L)
)
, (22)
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where β and L0
3 are defined as follows: β :=
a+ r
k
= a˜ + r˜, L0 :=
g + a
r + a
. Eq.(22) is a convenient
expression for the study of fixed points.
Lastly, the final trust equation is simply the non-dimensional version of Eq.(16):
dT
dτ
= T (T − L)(1− T ). (23)
Summing up, the assets, leverage and trust variables are governed by following system of three coupled
ordinary differential equations:
dA
dτ
=
(
g˜ − r˜L+ a˜(T − L)
1− T + (T − L)T
)
A,
dL
dτ
= (T − L)
(
g˜ − r˜L+ a˜(1− L)
1− T + (1− L)T
)
,
dT
dτ
= T (T − L)(1− T ),
(24)
(25)
(26)
where τ represents a non-dimensional time expressed in unit of the characteristic time scale 1/k defined
in the trust dynamics (15). The tildes on the model parameters (a˜, g˜, r˜) indicate that the paramters a, g
and r introduced above have also been normalised by k. The meaning of a˜, g˜ and r˜ are the following:
(i) 1/a˜ is the characteristic time scale for the debt to reach its optimal value (D → TA); (ii) g˜ is the
EBITA/Assets ratio, and (iii) r˜ is the interest rate paid on debt.
From the above assets, leverage, trust equations, it can be observed that the leverage and trust equations
constitute a sub-system (independent of A).
2.3 Closed-form solutions of the dynamics
The ROA can be obtained from Eq.(24) and the ROE can be obtained from Definition 1 and the
fundamental assets equation as presented in section 2.2.2 (i.e. Eq.(14)).
Result 1. The ROA and ROE as a function of trust and leverage, and dependent on the model
parameters a˜, g˜, r˜, are given by:
r˜A = g˜
1
1− T − r˜
L
1− T + a˜
T − L
1− T + (T − L)T, (27)
r˜E = g˜ +
L
1− L(g˜ − r˜). (28)
From Eq.(27), the different contributions to the ROA can be seen. The first term in the r.h.s. is the
EBITA/Assets ratio leveraged by trust (i.e. ∝ 11−T ). The second term is the cost of debt leveraged by
trust. The third term, which is also leveraged by trust, is positive (resp. negative) for T > L (resp.
T < L). It can be interpreted as a reward (resp. penalty) from being patient (resp. impatient) by first
building trust and then increasing leverage (resp. by increasing leverage before establishing trust). The
fourth term is the transient economic growth (resp. contraction) resulting from the catching up of an
economy that grows its leverage towards its optimal value from below (resp. above).
3L0 appears naturally when substituting Eq.(18) into Eq.(14) for T = 1, and then solving for L.
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In Eq.(28) for the ROE, we see that the term (g˜ − r˜) is leveraged by how close leverage is to its
maximum value 1.
The leverage/trust trajectories can be determined analytically based on Eq.(25) and (26). The results
derived in Appendix A can be summarised as follows.
Result 2. The leverage/trust trajectories are given by:
L(T ) = 1−K (1− T )
1+β
T β
e−
β
1−T + (L0 − 1)
{[
β
1 + β
+
1− T
1 + β
]
+
β
1 + β
T 2
(1− T )
∫ 1
0
(1− y)β+1e− βT1−T ydy
}
, (29)
where K is an integration constant, β := r˜ + a˜, and
L0 :=
g˜ + a˜
r˜ + a˜
. (30)
Eq.(29) is a closed-form analytical solution. It is also useful to use for instance an Euler discretisation
scheme to study numerically the different regimes described by Eq.(25) and (26).
2.4 Analysis of the leverage and trust subsystem (fixed points and stability)
The following theorems 1-3 present important properties of the system of equations as presented in
section 2.2.5. Their proof is provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. The fixed points of the leverage/trust subsystem are the points (T, L) = (0, L0) and
(T, L) = (1, L0), where L0 is defined by expression (30). Furthermore, the axis T = L is a fixed axis.
Theorem 2. Let (T ∗, L∗) be one of the fixed point of the subsystem of equations (25) and (26) for trust
and leverage. Then, these corresponding equations can be linearised close to (T ∗, L∗) using a Taylor
expansion around the fixed point to yielddTdτ
dL
dτ
 =
(2T ∗ − L∗)(1− T ∗)− T ∗(T ∗ − L∗) −T ∗(1− T ∗)
(1− L∗)
[
β L0−L
(1−T ∗)2 + 2T
∗ − L∗
]
−β L0+T ∗−2L∗1−T ∗ − T ∗(1 + T ∗ − 2L∗)

T − T ∗
L− L∗
 , (31)
The 2 by 2 matrix is the Jacobian whose eigenvalues can be studied for the different fixed points.
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated for a specific fixed point indicate whether that fixed point is
attractive or repulsive. We find that the point (T, L) = (1, L0) is attractive while the point (T, L) = (0, L0)
is repulsive. The axis T = L is (partly) attractive or repulsive depending on the model parameters
a˜, g˜, r˜. For L < L0, the axis T = L is attractive, while it is repulsive for L > L0. This implies that, if
g > r (then L0 > 1), the axis T = L will be entirely attractive for L ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 3. The corresponding ROA at the fixed points (T, L) = (1, L0) and (T, L) = (0, L0) is −a˜.
The ROA and ROE are equal on the fixed axis T = L and are given by:
r˜A|T=L = g˜ 1
1− L − r˜
L
1− L. (32)
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3 Phase portraits of leverage/trust trajectories and associated re-
turn on assets
3.1 Leverage/trust trajectories and return on assets: three cases
Fig.1-3 show the dynamics of trust, leverage and return on assets (taken as a proxy for economic
growth), together with their basins of attraction/repulsion, for three regimes: g˜ > r˜, g˜ < r˜ with g˜ < 0,
and g˜ = r˜.
In each figure, panel (a) shows the non-dimensional return on assets (Eq.(27)) in color code, corresponding
to the position (L, T ) in the diagram. Moreover, a number of trajectories (representing the vector
field) of leverage and trust given by Eq.(29) are shown. Green boldface dots and green lines indicate
attractive fixed points and lines, while the red boldface dots and red lines indicate the unstable points
and lines.
In each figure, panel (b) maps the different “basins of attraction” of the corresponding attractive fixed
points and lines. The various colours indicate the following:
• Light green area: domain of attraction towards the attractive axis T = L.
• Light red area: domain of attraction towards the fixed point (T, L) = (1, L0).
• Light blue area: the leverage increases (it may locally decrease) so that the trajectories eventually
leave the domain L ∈ [0, 1]. Mathematically, we have r˜L > 0 (locally r˜L ≤ 0 may occur).
The insets in panels (b) of Fig.1-3 show the return on assets on the axis T = L. The return on assets
increases, decreases or stays constant when L increases, depending on which case is studied (g˜ > r˜,
g˜ < r˜, or g˜ = r˜). Note that the return on assets is equal to the return on equity on the axis T = L
(Theorem 3).
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(a) Leverage/trust trajectories (black lines) and ROA (r˜A)
contour plot.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
a˜ = 0.1, g˜ = 0.06 , r˜= 0.04 , L0 = 1.1
L
T
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
r˜ A
| T
=
L
L
(b) Basins of attraction/repulsion and the return on assets
on the line T = L as figure inset.
Figure 1: The case g˜ > r˜ is illustrated. It can be observed that all trajectories (black/blue lines) converge to the
attractive fixed axis T = L (in green). On the line T = L, the return on assets is higher, the higher L is. Some of
the trajectories are highly curved, exemplifying the non-linear dynamics that follows from the model.
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Figure 2: The case g˜ < r˜ with g˜ < 0 is illustrated. It can be observed that the fixed axis T = L is partly
attractive (green) and partly repulsive (red). All trajectories in the T > L regime converge to the fixed point
(T, L) = (1, L0), shown as a green dot, where the return on assets is negative (−a˜). In the T < L regime, most
trajectories are expelled from the domain L ∈ [0, 1], while some trajectories converge to the attractive part of the
axis T = L.
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contour plot.
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Figure 3: The case g˜ = r˜ = 0 is illustrated. It can be observed that all trajectories (black/blue lines) converge to
the attractive fixed axis T = L (in green). On the line T = L, the return on assets is equal to zero: the economy
is, in the long-term, stuck in a state of no economic growth.
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3.2 The mechanism of reward and penalty in terms of long-term return on assets
An interesting feature of Fig.1 is that the leverage/trust trajectories are upward sloping in the T > L
domain, while they are downward sloping in the T < L domain. The higher Tstationary = Lstationary,
the higher the stationary ROA is. Hence, regular economies (g˜ > r˜) that first establish trust and
then increase leverage are rewarded with the highest steady-state (long-term) return on assets, while
economies that significantly increase leverage before having established trust are penalized with a lower
long-term return on assets. Since r˜A|T=L ∝ 11−L the reward for the patient economy that first builds
trust is substantial.
This existence of a reward when trust growth precedes leverage growth (and T > L) and the presence
of penalty when T < L are not always prevalent. In the case where g˜ < r˜ with g˜ negative (see Fig.2), it
can be observed that, in economies where trust is established first (T > L), the trajectories eventually
reach a steady-state point (T, L) = (1, L0) where the return on assets is negative (r˜A|(T=1,L=L0) = −a˜).
Some economies in the T < L regime are better off, namely those in the light green area in Fig.2b that
converge to the attractive part of the axis T = L where the ROA is still negative but is larger than −a˜.
The other economies in the T < L regime (light blue area in Fig.2b) are, however, in a very detrimental
regime. The trajectories there will eventually be expelled from the domain L ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, the
trust will be rapidly destroyed and will reach values close to zero, which implies that virtually no credit
is available in the economy (if the trust is 0, there are no assets that can qualify as collateral to obtain
a loan). On top of that, as can be observed from the contour plot of Fig.2a, the return on assets is
negative in the light blue area.
In the special case where g˜ = r˜ = 0 (Fig.3), there is no reward or penalty whatsoever, since all
trajectories move to the steady-state line T = L where the return on assets is zero. This steady-state is
reminiscent of the economic state in Japan since 1990 (often referred to as the “two lost decades”) and
in the Eurozone since the US-based subprime crisis in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe
starting in 2010. Japan and the Eurozone have been characterised by essentially vanishing interest rates
and very low economic growth. In January 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that it
will start to buy e60bn of bonds each month (“ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme”,
2015) from March 2015 for a determined period; this quantitative easing (QE) programme is a measure
meant to revitalise the economy of the Eurozone. In the context of our model in terms of interacting
assets, leverage and trust, this QE policy aims at boosting the parameter g˜, which ensures that the
long-term ROA (on the axis T = L) increases. We will analyse the impact of negative shocks and policy
response within the context of our model in section 4.
3.3 Transient costs before convergence to the beneficial fixed points for g˜ > r˜
In all cases, by definition of what is a fixed point, the steady-state growth of leverage is zero (i.e.
Lstationary = L
∗ = constant), or equivalently (based on Eq.(5)) the asset and debt value grow or shrink
at the same pace in the stationary (long-term) situation.
In the short-run however, the leverage is non constant and its dynamics may lead to non-intuitive
effects. For example, for g˜ > r˜ (Fig.1), in the T > L regime, the leverage increases in the short-run.
The long-term beneficial state of high ROA thus comes at a transient cost (r˜L > 0 ⇔ r˜D > r˜A in the
short-run). The transient cost is the result of a convergence of the economy to a sustainable stationary
fixed point (where the ROA is positive) with maximum output (Lstationary = Tstationary with a value
close to 1). The leverage increases in the short-run, which leads to a beneficial stationary state with a
high ROA; this makes the transient fast growth of debt tolerable in view of the beneficial long-term
goal.
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4 Leverage/trust trajectories with regime shifts
This section addresses the question of when and how should a central bank intervene in the face of a
shock to an economy. Should a central bank directly act or should it best be patient and intervene
relatively late? In the context of our model, we explore these questions by studying the trajectories in
the leverage/trust phase portrait under different regime shifts of the model parameters g˜ and r˜.
The model parameters r˜ and g˜ can be targeted by the central bank using conventional policy tools
(open market operations, standing facilities, minimum reserve requirements) or unconventional tools
(quantitative easing). For instance, a standard monetary intervention of a central bank at a time of
crisis is to target a decrease of the (short-term) interest rate. According to general economic theory, a
lower interest rate results in lower cost of borrowing, making it more attractive. The goal is to boost the
economy by enticing economic agents to take more risks by investing in potential sources of economic
growth. A short-term effect is also to encourage consumption, which has an immediate effect of GDP
(see e.g. Dalio (2015)).
Fig.4-6 depict single leverage/trust trajectories and their corresponding ROA and ROE. Regime shifts
in the model parameters g˜ and r˜ are introduced along the trajectory, which flows in the direction given
by the arrows. The relevant model parameters are given above each plot. The regime shifts in the
exogenous model parameters g˜ and r˜ attempt to capture the main aspects of economic reality. For
example, the EBITA/Assets ratio (g˜) of firms might abruptly change due to market changes or as a
result of being (indirectly) targeted through a central bank’s policy. The interest rate (r˜) can also
abruptly change as a result of a central bank’s policy to change its interest rate target.
Panels (a) depict the leverage/trust trajectories (in black), with the initial condition (T, L) = (0.26, 0).
Regime shifts in g˜ and r˜ are imposed along the trajectory. The black dot indicates the steady-state
point associated with the last values of the parameters. The dashed coloured lines show the continuation
of trajectories if no regime shift would have occurred (i.e., for constant g˜ and r˜). The value of the
exogenous parameters a˜, g˜, r˜ are shown above each curve segment. The regime shifts are visualised by
the kinks of the leverage/trust trajectory. They are also visible as jumps in the ROA, ROE plots shown
in panels (b) as a function of leverage. Note that, in each of the panels, it can be observed that the
return on assets is equal to the return on equity in the steady-state (where Tstationary = Lstationary).
Fig.4 corresponds to the situation where the intervention (second kink) corresponding to an increase of
g˜ and a decrease of r˜ occurs at an intermediate time τ = τ1. To study the effect of how the timing of
intervention affects the steady-state return on assets, two other cases are studed: Fig.5 corresponds to
a central bank intervention occurring earlier (at time τ = τ0 < τ1) while Fig.6 shows the case of an
intervention occurring later (τ = τ2 > τ1).
The effects of the timing of intervention is then summarised in Fig.7. Panels (a) and (b) show respectively
r˜A and r˜A(τ) · τ as a function of τ . The quantity r˜A(τ) · τ can be interpreted as the natural logarithm of
A(τ)/A(0) (the scaled asset value at time τ), since A(τ) = A(0)er˜A(τ)τ , which yields ln
(
A(τ)
A(0)
)
= r˜A(τ)τ .
Of course, this holds sensus stricto only for constant rA, so that rA(τ)τ is only a (good) approximation
of ln(A(τ)/A(0)). The main paradoxical conclusion obtained from Fig.7 is that optimising the long-term
ROA comes at the cost of extending the period of crisis.
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Figure 4: Leverage/trust trajectories (panel (a)) and their corresponding ROA and ROE (panel (b)) in the
presence of regime shifts imposed in the model parameters g˜ and r˜. Model parameters are given above the plots.
The arrows show the evolution during each regime. The regime shifts occur at the kinks in the leverage/trust
trajectory. They correspond to the jumps in the ROA, ROE plot in panel (b). The first regime shift at constant
interest rate r˜ and with a strong drop of g˜ is supposed to represent the shock of a financial and/or economic crisis.
The second regime shift represents the intervention of the central bank in the model economy, which decreases
the target interest rate and boosts the EBITA/Assets ratio.
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Figure 5: Same as figure 4 but with an earlier intervention of the central bank, represented by a quicker second
regime shift.
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Figure 6: Same as figure 4 but with a later intervention of the central bank, represented by a delayed second
regime shift.
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Figure 7: Assessment of the efficacy of the central bank’s policy intervention and the effect of its timing. The
blue curve corresponds to Fig.4, the red curve to Fig.5 (earlier intervention) and the black curve to Fig.6 (later
intervention). A late intervention (black curve) results in the highest long-term ROA but comes at the cost of
extending the crisis duration.
In the scenarios represented in Fig.4-6, we have assumed that the first regime change in which g˜ dropped
from a positive value to a negative value is completely exogenous (e.g. due to some external shock).
After this first shock, a need for intervention arises. As can be observed, the drop in g˜ immediately
leads to a negative return on assets and return on equity, and more importantly the trajectory would
now head towards a disadvantageous stationary state, i.e. the attractive fixed point (T, L) = (1, L0)
with a corresponding negative stationary ROA (equal to −a˜). In this stationary state, trust exceeds
leverage (i.e. Tstationary > Lstationary). This represents an economy in which not all resources are used
to their full potential (the economy is “under-leveraged”). There could be more credit available in the
economy to fund profitable projects in the case that the leverage would be equal to the trust (so full
potential would be: Tstationary = Lstationary).
Given the fact that intervention in the model economy is needed, the question then arises: what is
the optimal time is to intervene. Determining the optimal intervention time in our model economy
is analogous to studying optimal delays in an engineering control systems (Fridman, 2014). Too fast
reactions can lead to over-control and unwanted oscillations or instabilities. Too slow controls may let
unwanted regimes to develop.
Fig.7 shows that the highest steady-state return on assets is obtained in the case of late intervention
(τ = τ2 shown in figure 6). Fig.6a elucidates the mechanism driving this result: postponing the
intervention allows for a relatively strong increase in the trust variable together with some decrease in
leverage, if postponing the intervention long enough (leverage slightly decreases in the last part of the
path before intervention in Fig.6a). The strong increase in trust is the most notable difference observed
when comparing Fig.4a and 5a and it plays a crucial role to attain the highest steady-state return on
assets. This is because it is most effective to intervene when trust is high. Intervening when trust is
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high ensures convergence towards a fixed point Tstationary = Lstationary that is high on the diagonal and
this translates (for g˜ > r˜ > 0) into a high stationary ROA.
From a dynamical system point of view, that trust increases when g˜ drops (representing a crisis) results
from the fact that L0 is “pushed” inside the domain L ∈ [0, 1] and the trajectories “bend” towards
the attractive fixed point (T, L) = (1, L0), which simultaneously means that trust grows. Structurally,
the increase in trust results from our assumption in the fundamental trust Eq.(16) that trust increases
when T > L (and decreases when T < L). In other words, we have engineered an economy in which
there is an innate propensity for trust to develop up to its maximum, allowing in turn leverage to grow
so that the economy can attain its full potential of maximum growth. One could think that there
are regimes in which leverage L could grow faster than T , overtake it, which would then lead to a
subsequent decrease in trust. However, in the present formulation of our model, this is forbidden by the
“barrier” at T = L (the fixed axis) that cannot be crossed by any trajectory. This property comes from
the assumption underlying Eq.(17) in Appendix A that the difference between debt and its maximum
available amount tends to relax exponentially fast with rate a˜. Thus, if at some time, trust is larger
than leverage, it can only increase and remain in this region T ≥ L at all times.
The above results thus suggest that the optimal policy intervention strategy is to accept the economic
downturn for some time, thereby allowing trust to increase and leverage to decrease somewhat, and
then to intervene relatively late by boosting g˜ and lowering interest rates r˜.
One may question whether it makes sense that an economy in crisis can increase trust in the absence
of intervention. An increasing trust implies that the maximum sustainable leverage increases. With
the lower utilisation of means of production, this might actually reflect a reality. But the psychology
of economic agents in general dominates, with strong risk aversion developing during crisis, leading
to freezing of capital and under utilisation of resources. Such sub-optimal behaviour can be captured
mathematically by modifying the optimal learning embodied in Eq.(17) of Appendix A to a weaker
one that assumes less perfect anticipation of the optimal leverage. Relaxing the rigid structure of
Eq.(17) will have the immediate consequence that the axis T = L is no more a fixed axis under all
circumstances, so that more complex dynamics that can cross it could develop. This will be studied in
a subsequent publication.
5 Calibration of the model and performance
In this section, the model of the joint dynamics of assets, leverage and trust is calibrated to ROE data
of the EURO STOXX 50 over the time period 2000-2013, using Bayesian inference (i.e. the Gibbs
sampler).
5.1 Set-up of the calibration exercise
The specification of the model for the purpose of calibrating its ROE equation to ROE data is now
described. It consists in an observation equation complemented by state equations, together with
the specification of the prior distributions for the model parameters. The observation equation is the
discrete time version of Eq.(28) to which a stochastic residual is added. The state equations are the
discrete time versions of the model equations Eq.(25) and Eq.(26) for L and T studied previously. In
the state equations, we allow for two regimes to co-exist, corresponding to states s1 and s2 respectively
associated with two distinct values for the parameter gs. The transition between the two regimes is
described by a standard Markov Switching model with transition matrix Q.
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Observation Equation
[rE ]t = gsi +
Lt
1− Lt (gsi − rt) + t, t ∼ N (0, σ
2
 ), (33)
where t ∈ Z+ and si = si(t) ∈ {s1, s2} indicates the state at time t.
State Equations
Lt+1 = Lt + (Tt − Lt)
(
gsi − rtLt + a(1− Lt)
1− Tt + k(1− Lt)Tt
)
∆t, (34)
Tt+1 = Tt + kTt (Tt − Lt) (1− Tt)∆t, (35)
gsi =
{
c1 in s1,
c2 in s2,
(Markov Switching Model). (36)
Priors
σ2 ∼ IG(10−2, 10−2), c1, c2 ∼ U(−0.25, 0.25).
(IG denotes the inverse gamma distribution and U denotes the uniform distribution).
Transition rate matrix: Q =
[−λ λ
µ −µ
]
, λ, µ ∼ U(0, 100).
Initial conditions: L1 ∼ U(0.2, 0.3), T1 ∼ U(0.3, 0.4).
Parameter values: a = 0.05, k = 0.05, ∆t = 0.1.
We sample 200 times and a burn-in sample of 100 is chosen (i.e. the first 100 samples are discarded).
Uninformative priors for the variance of the noise term t and most other parameters (c1, c2, λ, µ) are
chosen. The inverse gamma distribution is commonly used as a prior for the variance of noise terms.
Restrictions are imposed on L1 and T1 to ensure that all variables remain finite and that T > L. The
parameters that govern time scales (a, k,∆t) are chosen to be constant and such that all variables
remain finite. The time step ∆t = 0.1 (year) corresponds to approximately one month, in line with the
fact that we supply one data point for [rE ]t and rt per month (12 data points per year).
We could have chosen to estimate the model parameters a and k as well, as long as k and a remain
positive and do not cause variables to become infinite. However, estimating a and k (e.g. a ∼ U(0, 10)
and k ∼ U(0, 1)) will cause the dynamics of leverage and trust to become somewhat redundant due to
the fact that in this way a, k will be such that leverage and trust very quickly become constant. This
would effectively reduce the system of equations that is used for fitting to only Eq.(33) and Eq.(36)
with rt supplied as data and Lt constant. To preclude that leverage and trust very quickly reach a
steady-state, we assign constant values to a and k. The parameter a is chosen to be small (and of the
same order of magnitude as g) to make sure that g+ a and thus L0 changes significantly when the state
is changed (from s1 to s2 or vice versa). Indeed, recall that L0 controls the position of the attractive
fixed point (1, L0). This results in a leverage Lt that fluctuates (decreases in one state, increases in the
other state). Furthermore, k is chosen such that k ·∆t is small, which precludes that L→ 1 and T → 1
so as to avoid the divergences associated with the terms 1/(1− L) and 1/(1− T ) in Eq.(33) and (34).
The empirical time series rt is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (“Interest Rates,
Discount Rate for Euro Area”, n.d.) and the time series [rE ]t is calculated based on data obtained
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from Thomson Reuters of the adjusted closing prices of the EURO STOXX 50. The supplied return on
equity values are monthly averaged yearly returns.
5.2 ROE and EBITA/Assets ratio: estimated distributions
Fig.8 and 9 present the calibrated distribution of the EBITA/Assets ratio g and the return on equity
(ROE) rE respectively, based on the model specification of section 5.1.
The light red shade is used to distinguish states 1 and 2 and to delineate the switching events between
the states. The probability distribution is shown with the different shades of blue, that is: 20% of the
observations lie within the dark blue region, another 20% in the lighter blue region that surrounds the
dark blue one, and so on. The probability distribution of g is narrow and the different shades cannot
be (easily) observed.
Fig.9 shows that the model as presented in section 5.1 is successful in fitting the return on equity of the
EURO STOXX 50 for the time period 2000-2013. It can be observed that the switches between the
states, which are endogenously determined in the model, occur at the same times as the shocks/jumps
in the actual ROE data. Furthermore, the light red shade corresponds to the periods of negative equity
returns (crisis). The proposed dynamics of the EBITA/Assets ratio g shown in Fig.8 is crucial to
obtain a good fit of the ROE data and it is clear that the Markov Switching Model with two states is
successful.
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Figure 8: Calibrated distribution of the EBITA/Assets ratio g. A Markov Switching Model (MSM) with two
states was specified for g, which explains the observed two levels. The MSM can be viewed as an extended
piecewise constant model where the switching between states is endogenized. The light red shade is used to
distinguish states 1 and 2 and to show the switching events between the states. The probability distribution is
shown with different shades of blue: 20% of the observations lie within the dark blue region, another 20% in the
lighter blue region that surrounds the dark blue one, and so on. The black line shows the median (point estimate).
It can be observed that g is negative in the state shaded with light red, while it is positive in the other state.
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Figure 9: Calibrated distribution of the ROE rE . The light red shade is used to distinguish state 1 and 2 and
to show the switching events between the states. The states are endogenously determined by the model. The
probability distribution is shown with different shades of blue. The white line shows the median (point estimate).
The red line shows the actual returns of the EURO STOXX 50 (monthly averaged yearly returns) for comparison.
It can be observed that the switches between the states occur at the same times as the shocks/jumps in the
actual ROE data. The light red shades are seen to correspond to the periods of negative equity returns (crisis).
The first period of crisis corresponds to the dot com crash, the second to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the
third is associated with the Greek sovereign debt crisis.
5.3 Leverage and Trust: estimated distributions
Fig.10 presents the resulting plots of the leverage (panel (a)) and trust (panel (b)) as a function of
time, obtained using the model set-up of section 5.1. Fig.10a shows that the leverage decreases in the
state shaded with light red (crisis state) and increases in the other state. This is a consequence of the
fact that L0 :=
g+a
r+a is negative in the state shaded with light red (g + a ≈ −0.16 + 0.05 = −0.11 with
g taken from Fig.8), while it is positive in the other state (g + a ≈ 0.1 + 0.05 = 0.15). Recall that
(T, L) = (1, L0) is an attractive fixed point.
The trust/leverage trajectory lies in the T > L regime as a consequence of the priors chosen for L1 and
T1. As discussed previously in section 4, the increase in trust is the result of the assumption in the
fundamental trust equation (Eq.(16)) that trust increases when T > L (and decreases when T < L)
together with the fact that agents anticipate optimally the evolution of leverage. This leads to an
uncrossable “barrier” at the fixed axis T = L, so that trust can only increase when starting from an
initial condition with T > L.
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Fig.10b furthermore shows that trust is almost constant. This is due to the fact that the “updating
term” in Eq.(35) is relatively small (k ·∆t = 0.005), making trust essentially constant. Fig.10 also
illustrates that L = 1 and T = 1 are avoided. This is important because the model blows up whenever
T → 1 or L→ 1, since its equations exhibit terms proportional to 1/(1−L) and 1/(1− T ) (see Eq.(33)
and (34)).
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(a) Calibrated distribution of L as a function of time.
The leverage decreases in the state shaded with light
red, while it increases in the other state. This results
from the fact that g and thus L0 change significantly
when the states are switched ((T, L) = (1, L0) is an
attractive fixed point).
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(b) Calibrated distribution of T as a function of time.
The trust slightly increases to a level determined by
the values of k and ∆t.
Figure 10: Calibrated distributions of leverage and trust. The light red shade is used to distinguish state 1 and 2
and to show the switching events between the states. The states are endogenously determined by the model. The
probability distributions are shown with the different shades of blue. The black line shows the median (point
estimate).
6 Conclusion
A macroeconomic model has been proposed based on the economic variables (i) assets, (ii) leverage
and (iii) trust. The main motivation to use these three variables is to focus on the role of credit in the
dynamics of economic growth, and to investigate how credit may be associated with both economic
performance and confidence.
Fundamental economic relations and assumptions have been used to describe the joint dynamics of these
three variables. The interplay between assets, leverage and trust has been presented in leverage/trust
trajectory plots, accompanied by contour plots of the return on assets. Several interesting features of
the assets, leverage and trust model have been discussed.
The first notable insight is the mechanism of reward/penalty associated with patience, as quantified by
the return on assets. In regular economies (g > r), starting with a trust higher than leverage results in
the highest long-term return on assets (which can be seen as a proxy for economic growth). Therefore,
patient economies that first build trust and then increase leverage are positively rewarded. We also
find that a positive development does not need to be monotonous: before reaching the happy positive
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growth steady state: an economy can live through transient regimes during which debt growth exceeds
asset growth in the short-run, before converging to the most favourable long-term state.
Our second main finding concerns a recommendation for the reaction of a central bank to an external
shock that affect negatively the economic growth. For this, regime shifts associated with exogenous
changes of model parameters have been studied for different leverage/trust trajectories. The regime
shifts represent sudden changes in economic parameters, as a result of a crisis, or due to the intervention
of a central bank. Based on the sample trajectories, the effect of the timing of policy intervention has
been studied. It was found that late policy intervention in the model economy results in the highest
long-term return on assets and largest asset value. Of course, this comes at the cost of suffering longer
from the crisis until the intervention occurs. The phenomenon that late intervention is most effective to
attain a high long-term return on assets can be ascribed to the fact that postponing intervention allows
trust to increase first, and it is most effective to intervene when trust is high.
These results derive from our first assumption that trust tends to increase when it is above leverage
together with our second assumption that economic agents use an optimal learning embodied in Eq.(17)
of Appendix A of what should be the utilisation of debt for a given level of trust and amount of assets.
Relaxing this with less optimal learning may lead to more complex dynamics, which will be studied in
a subsequent publication.
We have also presented a calibration of the model to empirical data. A calibration set-up has been
proposed, based on the Euler discretisation of our differential equations governing the dynamics of
asset, leverage and trust. By specifying a Markov Switching Model for the EBITA/Assets ratio g, the
model was shown to be very successful in fitting the empirical data of the return on equity of the EURO
STOXX 50 for the time period 2000-2013.
The fitted distribution of leverage was found to decrease in the state corresponding to crises and to
increase in the other growing economy state. In the calibrated distribution of the trust variable, it
can be observed that there is no time at which trust decreases. This is again a consequence of the
assumption in the fundamental trust equation that trust increases when T > L (and decreases when
T < L) together with the assumption of optimal learning of the optimal level of debt.
The presented figures also show that the dynamics of leverage and trust can be highly non-monotonous
with curved trajectories, as a result of the nonlinear coupling between the variables. This has an
important implication for policy makers, suggesting that simple linear forecasting can be deceiving in
some regimes and may lead to inappropriate policy decisions.
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Appendices
A Closed-form solution of leverage as a function of trust
The leverage/trust trajectories can be solved analytically (closed-form) based on Eq.(25) and (26). We
will outline the derivation and provide the result.
The first step in deriving the closed form solution is to divide Eq.(25) by Eq.(26):
dL
dT
=
1
T (1− T )
(
g˜ − r˜L+ a˜(1− L)
1− T + (1− L)T
)
. (37)
In terms of β and L0, Eq.(37) is given by:
dL
dT
=
1
T (1− T )
(
β
L0 − L
1− T + T (1− L)
)
, (38)
=
β
T
· L0 − 1
(1− T )2 +
[
β
T (1− T )2 +
1
1− T
]
(1− L) . (β 6= 0,±∞) (39)
Eq.(39) is a first order linear differential equation. Solving Eq.(39) yields:
L(T ) = 1−K (1− T )
1+β
T β
e−
β
1−T + (L0 − 1)
{[
β
1 + β
+
1− T
1 + β
]
+
β
1 + β
T 2
(1− T )
∫ 1
0
(1− y)β+1e− βT1−T ydy
}
, (40)
where K is an integration constant.
B Proof of Theorems 1-3
B.1 Determination of fixed points and Jacobian
The fixed (stationary) points are the set (T, L) for which dLdτ = 0 and
dT
dτ = 0. From Eq.(26) and Eq.(22)
(which are valid for k 6= 0), it follows that the axis T = L and the point (T, L) = (0, L0) satisfy this
condition. Furthermore, (T, L) = (1, L0) is a fixed point. To show this, consider (14), (18), (16) in
non-dimensional time for T = 1: 
dA
dτ
∣∣∣∣
T=1
= g˜A− r˜D + dD
dτ
,
dD
dτ
∣∣∣∣
T=1
= a˜(A−D) + dA
dτ
,
dT
dτ
∣∣∣∣
T=1
= 0,
(41)
so: dTdτ = 0 (as required to classify as fixed point) and one can substitute the first equation of system
(41) into the second to find under what condition a solution is admitted:
dA
dτ
= g˜A− r˜D + a˜(A−D) + dA
dτ
, (42)
⇔ L := D/A = g˜ + a˜
r˜ + a˜
=
g + a
r + a
:= L0. (43)
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To summarize, the fixed points are: the axis T = L, the point (T, L) = (0, L0), and the point
(T, L) = (1, L0).
Now in order to be able to analyse the stability of the fixed points, define h := dTdτ and g :=
dL
dτ .
Furthermore, assume that (T ∗, L∗) is an arbitrary fixed point. Now the linear system for (T, L) close to
(T ∗, L∗) can be represented by a Taylor expansion around the fixed point:
dT
dτ
= h(T ∗, L∗) + (T − T ∗) · ∂h
∂T
∣∣∣∣
T ∗,L∗
+ (L− L∗) · ∂h
∂L
∣∣∣∣
T ∗,L∗
+ . . . , (44)
dL
dτ
= g(T ∗, L∗) + (T − T ∗) · ∂g
∂T
∣∣∣∣
T ∗,L∗
+ (L− L∗) · ∂g
∂L
∣∣∣∣
T ∗,L∗
+ . . . . (45)
Note that: h(T ∗, L∗) =
dT
dτ
∣∣∣∣
T ∗,L∗
= 0 and g(T ∗, L∗) =
dL
dτ
∣∣∣∣
T ∗,L∗
= 0 (the point (T ∗, L∗) was defined to
be a fixed point), so the resulting system is given by:dTdτ
dL
dτ
 =
 ∂h∂T
∣∣
T ∗,L∗
∂h
∂L
∣∣
T ∗,L∗
∂g
∂T
∣∣
T ∗,L∗
∂g
∂L
∣∣
T ∗,L∗

T − T ∗
L− L∗
 , (46)
where the 2 by 2 matrix is the Jacobian evaluated at the fixed point (T ∗, L∗).
The Jacobian matrix J in its most general variant is given by:
J =
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
=
[
∂T
dT
dτ ∂L
dT
dτ
∂T
dL
dτ ∂L
dL
dτ
]
, (47)
which in this case becomes (using Eq.(26) and Eq.(22)):
J = J(T, L) =
[
(2T − L)(1− T )− T (T − L) −T (1− T )
(1− L)
[
β L0−L
(1−T )2 + 2T − L
]
−β L0+T−2L1−T − T (1 + T − 2L)
]
. (48)
The Jacobian in Eq.(48) can be used to determine the (linear) stability of the fixed points.
B.2 T = L analysed: stability and ROA
Stability
The Jacobian matrix (Eq.(48)) evaluated at T = L is given by:
J(L,L) =
[
L(1− L) −L(1− L)
(1− L)
[
β L0−L
(1−L)2 + L
]
−β L0−L1−L − L(1− L)
]
. (49)
The eigenvalues (denoted λ1, λ2) are: λ1 = 0, λ2 = x+ y = −β L0−L(1−L) . 4
4The eigenvalues of the matrix J(L,L) can be calculated by solving the following equation for λ: det(J(L,L)−λI) = 0,
where I is the identity matrix.
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Both eigenvalues are real. If both eigenvalues are negative, then the axis T = L is attractive/stable,
while the axis is repulsive/unstable when at least one of the eigenvalues is positive. From λ2, it then
follows that (assuming L ∈ [0, 1] and β > 0):{
For L < L0, the axis T = L is attractive.
For L > L0, the axis T = L is repulsive.
Note that the above implies that, if g > r (then: L0 > 1), the axis T = L will be entirely attractive for
L ∈ [0, 1].
ROA
The corresponding non-dimensional return on assets on the axis T = L is given by:
r˜A|T=L (27)= g˜ 1
1− L − r˜
L
1− L, (50)
⇔ r˜A|T=L = g˜ + L
1− L(g˜ − r˜)
(28)
= r˜E . (51)
From Eq.(51), it follows that on the axis T = L the return on equity and the return on assets are equal.
This result r˜A = r˜E on T = L economically are intuitive. The axis T = L is a steady-state axis and
thus describes long-run behaviour. Hence the result can be interpreted as that in the long-run the
return on financial investments (i.e. the return on equity) should equal the growth of the economy
(return on assets). This is in line with the reasoning by Sornette and Cauwels (2014) and Dalio (2015).
By expressing Eq.(51) as follows:
r˜A|T=L = r˜ + (g˜ − r˜) 1
1− L, (52)
the derivative with respect to L can be easily computed. The derivative of Eq.(52) with respect to L
indicates whether r˜A|T=L increases, decreases or stays constant for increasing L. Taking the derivative
with respect to L of Eq.(52) gives:
d
dL
r˜A|T=L = g˜ − r˜
(1− L)2 , (53)
which expresses that: if g˜ > r˜ (g˜ < r˜) then: r˜A|T=L increases (decreases) when L increases. When
g˜ = r˜ then r˜A|T=L is constant with respect to L. Note that the trajectories can never move on the axis
T = L (since points on the axis T = L are in steady-state); however the result is useful to compare the
different steady-state points on the axis T = L.
B.3 (T, L) = (0, L0) analysed: stability and ROA
Stability
The Jacobian matrix (Eq.(48)) evaluated at T = 0, L = L0 is given by:
J(0, L0) =
[ −L0 0
−(1− L0)L0 βL0
]
, (54)
with eigenvalues λ1 = −L0, and λ2 = βL0. The eigenvalues are of opposite sign. Hence, the stationary
point is a saddle point, which is unstable.
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ROA
The non-dimensional return on assets in the fixed point (T, L) = (0, L0) is given by:
r˜A|T=0,L=L0
(27)
= g˜ − r˜L0 − a˜L0 = −a˜, (55)
which is negative since a˜ > 0.
B.4 (T, L) = (1, L0) analysed: stability and ROA
Stability
In order to investigate the stability of the point (T, L) = (1, L0), it is not possible to consider the
Jacobian since this would presume T 6= 1 (the Jacobian contains elements ∝ 11−T ). With perturbation
analysis, it is however possible to show that (T, L) = (1, L0) is an attractive fixed point. To do so,
consider a small perturbation from the point T = 1:
T = 1 + T , (56)
where T denotes the perturbation. Then by inserting Eq.(56) and L = L0 into Eq.(26), the following
equation is obtained:
dT
dτ
= −T ·
(
T + (1− L0)
)
(1 + T ) ≈ −T ·
(
T + (1− L0)
) ≈ −T · (1− L0), (57)
where a first order approximation is taken (the terms proportional to 2T or higher order terms are
neglected).
By separating variables and integrating Eq.(57), one can find that:
T = Ce
−(1−L0)τ , (58)
showing that T → 0 when τ →∞ if L0 < 1, which shows that T = 1 is attractive if L0 < 1. Eq.(43)
showed that L = L0 is the only solution admitted for L, hence: (T, L) = (1, L0) is an attractive fixed
point if L0 < 1.
ROA
To determine the non-dimensional return on assets at the fixed point (T, L) = (1, L0), note that Eq.(27)
can also be expressed as:
r˜A = −a˜+ βL0 − L
1− T + (T − L)T. (59)
In order to be able to take the limit T → 1, a double integration by parts of Eq.(40) can be performed
to arrive at:
L(T ) = L0 −K (1− T )
1+β
T β
e−
β
1−T + (L0 − 1)(1− T )
{
− 1
β
+
∫ 1
0
(1− y)β−1e− βT1−T ydy
}
. (60)
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One can now substitute Eq.(60) into Eq.(59) to obtain:
r˜A = −a˜+ β
(
K
(1− T )β
T β
e−
β
1−T + (1− L0)
[
− 1
β
+
∫ 1
0
(1− y)β−1e− βT1−T y dy
])
+ (T − L)T, (61)
and therefore:
lim
T→1
r˜A|L=L0 = −a˜− β(1− L0)
1
β
+ (1− L0) = −a˜. (62)
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